Evidence - Admission against Interest - Use of Plea of Guilty against Defendant in Subsequent Civil Action by Nordhaugen, Curtis A.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 36 Number 1 Article 10 
1960 
Evidence - Admission against Interest - Use of Plea of Guilty 
against Defendant in Subsequent Civil Action 
Curtis A. Nordhaugen 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nordhaugen, Curtis A. (1960) "Evidence - Admission against Interest - Use of Plea of Guilty against 
Defendant in Subsequent Civil Action," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 36 : No. 1 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol36/iss1/10 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. 
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
NORTH DAKOTA. LAW REVIEW
Most courts do not exclude logically relevant evidence of other transactions
merely because it tends to show the defendant is guilty of another crime. 10
On the other hand, and of primary importance, despite a general relaxation
of the rule,, many courts still exclude!.this evidence where its probative value
does not outweigh its prejudical effect." From the decisions discussed it is
possible to conclude that the court in the instant case may not have weighed
this relationship properly.
Irrespective of this and taking into consideration the points thus far enumer-
ated, it is clear that in an accusatorial system of justice, such as ours, the
specific crime in issue must at all costs be the focal point about which proof
is to be marshalled.'
RICIHARD H. SKJERVEN
EVIDENCE - ADMISSION AGAINST INTEREST -USE OF PLEA OF GUILTY
AGAINST DEFENDANT IN SUBSEQUENT CIVIL ACTION - Plaintiff brought an
action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in an upset of an
automobile while riding as a guest of the defendant. The Trial Court granted
a verdict for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed alleging that the
court erred in giving instructions that defendant's admission of plea of guilty
in a prior criminal action, arising out of the same accident, could only bear
upon the defendant's credibility. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held
that instructions limiting evidentiary effect of host's plea of guilty to his
credibility was erroneous and prejudicial. Borstad v. La Roque, 98 N.W.2d 16
(N.D. 1959).
There is authority holding that a plea of guilty in a criminal case. is an
admission against the party thereto in a subsequent civil case when the civil
action involves the same offense for which the criminal prosecution was institi-
tuted.I However, the plea of guilty is not conclusive and may be explained.2
Some courts hold that defendant's plea of guilty is only an admission against
his interest, and cannot be used as proof of the facts alleged in the civil
action. 3 It has been held that defendant's plea of guilty is admissible against
him in a subsequent civil action even though defendant withdrew his plea
of guilty and pleaded not guilty, 4 because the admission tends to some extent
to support the plaintiff's charges.5 A plea of Nolo Contendere, however,
which is generally defined as an implied confession (as distinguished from a
it one - In a very real sense a defendant starts his life afresh when he stands before
a jury, a prisoner at the bar."
10. People v. Carmelo, 94 Cal. App. 2d 301, 210 P.2d 5:38 (1949); Turner v. State,
187 Tenn. 309, 213 S.W.2d 281 (1948).
ll.-Harris v. State, 88 Okla. Crim. 422, 204 P.2d 305 (1949); Day v. Conmonwealth,
196 Va. 907, 86 S.E.2d 23 (1955).
12. See People v. Molineaux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901); State v. Emanuel,
42 Wash. 1, 253 P.2d 386 (1953).
1. Motley v. Page, 250 Ala. 265, 34 So.2d 201 (1948); Odian v. Habernicht, 133
Cal.2d 201, 283 P.2d 756 (1955); see Konshuk v. Hayes, 150 Wash. 565, 273 Pac.
957 (1929).
2. Moulin v. Bergeron, 135 Conn. 443, 65 A.2d 478 (1949); Utt v. Herold, 127
W. Va. 719, 34 S.E.2d 357 (1945).
3. Ralston v. Ralston. 45 Del. 305, 72 A.2d 441 (1950); see Rednall v. Thompson,
108 Cal.2d 662, 239 P.2d 693 (1952).
4. Morrissey v. Powell, 304 Mass. 268,. 23 N.EA2d 411 (1939) (Withdrawal of plea
of guilty does not amount to complete destruction of force and effect of prior plea of
guilty).
5. Vaughn v. Jonas, 31 Cal.2d 586, 191 P.2d 432 (1948).
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direct admission) of guilt, does not constit ute such an admission of guilt, that
it will be permitted in evidence in a civil action., North Dakota holds that
defendant's plea of guilty in a criminal action can be used as evidence against
him in a subsequent civil action, not only as an admission against interest,
but also as affecting credibility.7
CURTIS A. NORDHAUCEN
JOINT TENANCY- JOINT ACCOUNTS IN SAVINGS BANKS- INTENT TO MAKE
A VALID GiFr. - The administrator brought an action to recover funds de-
posited in a joint account of decedent and defendants. In 1950, a bank
signature card was executed which authorized defendant to draw on decedent's
account. In late 1954, the account, with survivorship agreement, was created
and remained in effect until decedent's death in December 1955. Decedent,
an attorney, had given defendants, his nephew and wife, a farm and several
other gifts during his life. The district court held that the joint account was
executed for business convenience and necessity, and that it was not the
intention of the decedent to vest ownership in the defendants. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Idaho held, two justices dissenting, that the judgment
be affirmed. Idaho First Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank of Caldwell,' 340 P.2d
1103 (Idaho 1959).
The majority relied on Shurrum v. Watts,2 in which the court held that
during the lifetime of the parties, the presumption of joint tenancy and right
of survivorship is rebuttable. Idaho has joined that group of states that hold
such an account may effect a gift, and that the execution of such an account
raises a presumption of a valid joint teanancy.3 However, the majority holding,
by making the intent of the depositor the determinative factor, places the
burden of proof on the survivor, and leaves the survivorship agreement with-
out force or effect.
4
The dissenting judges relied on Gray v. Gray,5 in which the court established
the validity of joint accounts in Idaho, holding that where the essentials of
a valid joint tenancy as set out in the statute 6 are present, the right of the
survivor vested at the time the account was created. The dissent further
states that the agreement should be conclusive evidence of an intent to make
6. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cloonan, 165 Kan. 68, 193 P.2d 656 (1948);
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Connally, 206 La. 883, 20 So2d 168 (1944); see Winesett
v. Scheidt, 239 N.C. 190, 79 S.E.2d 501 (1954).
7. Clark v. Josephson, 66 N.W.2d 539 (N.D. 1954) (admission against fnterest);
Engstrom v. Nelson, 41 N.D. 530, 171 N.W. 90 (1919) (admission against interest);
Schnase v. Goetz, 18 N.D. 594, 120 N.W. 553 (1909) (credibility).
1. Contra, Gray v. Gray, 78 Idaho 439, 304 P.2d 650, 654, 655 (1956-.
2. 80 Idaho 44, 3o4 P.2d 380, 383 (1958).
3. Gray v. Gray, 78 Idaho 439, 304 P.2d 650, 654 (1956). (Some hold -intention to
make a gift is supplied by a presumption from the form of the deposit. Others deny Ihis
presumption. Idaho, in Gray v. Gray, supra, followed the former, but in the instant case
the court has completely reversed itself).
4. In the instant case the dissent stated that the majority rule would permit such an
act to be challenged in virtually every instance, 'd fo-c, the survivor to prove the de-
cedent did precisely what he uneqivocally stated in writing that he did. Compare with
O'Brian v. Biegger, 233 Iowa 1179, 11 N.W.2d 412 (1943).
5. 78 Idaho 439, 304 P.2d, 650 (1956).
6. Idaho Code Ann., § 26-1014 (1959) (Provides that when a deposit has been made
in two or more names payable to any ,of such persons o-.r to the survivor, it may be
paid to any of said persons, whether the other be living or not, and such payment shall
discharge the bank making the payment from its obligation to the depositors).
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